It is well known that in the Expected Utility Theory, a Bayesian decision maker is indifferent to a costless information, if that does not change the optimal decision. In this paper it is proved that, if indifference with respect to a non-significant information is assumed, (under a very natural stability hypothesis) a Bayesian agent should follow the expected utility theory; this provides a system of axioms for the theory of expected utility, which is alternative to the classical one.

An alternative Approach to Expected Utility Theory

REGOLI, Giuliana
1995

Abstract

It is well known that in the Expected Utility Theory, a Bayesian decision maker is indifferent to a costless information, if that does not change the optimal decision. In this paper it is proved that, if indifference with respect to a non-significant information is assumed, (under a very natural stability hypothesis) a Bayesian agent should follow the expected utility theory; this provides a system of axioms for the theory of expected utility, which is alternative to the classical one.
1995
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11391/119049
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