The power of the execution judge to revoke the sentence in cases of abolitio criminis may be considered a privileged test-bed for probing the current web of relations between the cognitive phase and the execution phase, and, more generally, of the delicate balance between the need to avoid unlimited encroachments on profiles covered by the judgement and the need to satisfy instances of justice and equity. The relevance of the issues justifies the heated debates and numerous interventions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court on certain particularly complex interpretative issues. Moreover, the potentialities of the institute are at the basis of expansive ferments that have affected practically all the profiles of the discipline of Article 673 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including that of the operational scope, often evoked also with regard to situations and contexts objectively heterogeneous but in which an analogous need is felt to satisfy the needs of justice subsequent to the irrevocability; between leaps forward and setbacks, the provision in question is constantly at the centre of the legal reflection of doctrine and jurisprudence.
Il potere del giudice dell’esecuzione di revocare la sentenza nei casi di abolitio criminis può essere considerato un banco di prova privilegiato per sondare l’attuale trama dei rapporti tra la fase della cognizione e quella dell’esecuzione, e, più in generale, del delicato bilanciamento tra l’esigenza di evitare illimitati sconfinamenti su profili coperti dal giudicato e la necessità di soddisfare istanze di giustizia e di equità. La rilevanza delle tematiche intersecate giustifica gli accesi dibattiti e i numerosi interventi delle Sezioni Unite e della Corte costituzionale su alcune questioni interpretative particolarmente complesse. Inoltre, le potenzialità dell’istituto sono alla base di fermenti espansivi che hanno interessato praticamente tutti i profili della disciplina di cui all’art. 673 c.p.p., incluso quello dell’ambito operativo, spesso evocato anche in ordine a situazioni e contesti obiettivamente eterogenei ma nei quali si avverte un’analoga necessità di soddisfare esigenze di giustizia postume all’irrevocabilità; tra fughe in avanti e battute di arresto la disposizione in questione è costantemente al centro della riflessione giuridica di dottrina e giurisprudenza.
La revoca per abolitio criminis
R. Fonti
2023
Abstract
The power of the execution judge to revoke the sentence in cases of abolitio criminis may be considered a privileged test-bed for probing the current web of relations between the cognitive phase and the execution phase, and, more generally, of the delicate balance between the need to avoid unlimited encroachments on profiles covered by the judgement and the need to satisfy instances of justice and equity. The relevance of the issues justifies the heated debates and numerous interventions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court on certain particularly complex interpretative issues. Moreover, the potentialities of the institute are at the basis of expansive ferments that have affected practically all the profiles of the discipline of Article 673 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including that of the operational scope, often evoked also with regard to situations and contexts objectively heterogeneous but in which an analogous need is felt to satisfy the needs of justice subsequent to the irrevocability; between leaps forward and setbacks, the provision in question is constantly at the centre of the legal reflection of doctrine and jurisprudence.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
