The imaginative Apprehension.The Image-Consciousness in Husserl’s Phenomenology

The concept of imaginative consciousness is an important element in the husserlian Phenomenology. The purpose of this work is to highlight some fundamental aspects of this important act, moving from things self and from perception. First of all, we will show that perception begins with a stimulus that comes from the thing. We will clarify that this activity of the thing offers to consciousness the presentation of a precise content: the essence of the thing itself. The consciousness, in turn, "impressed" by such a content, reacts by registering it (first perception) and thus creating a flow of lived experiences (Erlebnisse). To this act of presentation by the thing follows an act of presentification by the consciosness. Through the imagination, the imaginative-consciusness (Bildbewusstsein) fills the adumbraments (Abschattungen), which the presentation itself brings with it. Finally, through the act of retention, perception reaches its perfection in this presentification through the imaginative act.