The paper focuses on a prominent countertradition to the idea that thoughts, statements, and beliefs have content in virtue of their capacity to represent reality accurately. Davidson ascribes to this countertradition representationalism in favor of a new way of describing knowledge and inquiry. He has provided antirepresentationalism an impetus through his critique of the foundations of the scheme-content dichotomy. This dualism is grounded in the conception of the “mind with its private states and objects” and in the idea that truth consists in the accurate mirroring of facts. The demolition of what Davidson refers to as the “myth of subjective” brings with it a refusal of the notion of correspondence between language and world, between sentences and facts—a refusal of the idea that statements and beliefs correspond or are “made true by facts.”
Davidson and the Demise of Representationalism
MARCHETTI, Giancarlo
2011
Abstract
The paper focuses on a prominent countertradition to the idea that thoughts, statements, and beliefs have content in virtue of their capacity to represent reality accurately. Davidson ascribes to this countertradition representationalism in favor of a new way of describing knowledge and inquiry. He has provided antirepresentationalism an impetus through his critique of the foundations of the scheme-content dichotomy. This dualism is grounded in the conception of the “mind with its private states and objects” and in the idea that truth consists in the accurate mirroring of facts. The demolition of what Davidson refers to as the “myth of subjective” brings with it a refusal of the notion of correspondence between language and world, between sentences and facts—a refusal of the idea that statements and beliefs correspond or are “made true by facts.”I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
