De Gaulle's attitude towards Italy after the fall of the Fascist regime has changed from the initial possibility of a rapprochement to the indifference and even hostility shown towards Italian residents, prisoners, patriots, etc. Furthermore the General’s attitude towards Italy was influenced by the Allied policy towards our country: not being invited to attend the signing of the armistice caused the non-recognition of Italy as a Cobelligerent nation, while the repeal of the 1940 armistice by Badoglio provided the legal justification for considering Italians as still enemies and acting accordingly. Again the exclusion from the Yalta conference led de Gaulle to give the order to invade the Aosta Valley. The enthusiasm shown by the Italians about the (few) words pronounced in July 1943 by de Gaulle did not get a positive feedback on the French side. The anti-fascists who had fought the regime and acclaimed de Gaulle were nevertheless forced to accept French requests, for example about Tunisia, with much suffering, aware of the injustices and mistreatment of Italian residents. General de Gaulle personal papers, which contain unpublished documents exchanged with his closest collaborators, such as Massigli, Couve de Murville, Burin des Roziers, etc., reveal the real intentions that the French leader was able to hide in the meetings with the Italian representatives. The analysis of these papers clearly shows the French persistent recriminations and the possibility of making an arrangement only in order to protect their own interests and leadership in Europe or in the colonies.
I rapporti tra il governo italiano e il Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française, 1944-1945. Dalle carte personali del generale de Gaulle
Sommella, Valentina
2010
Abstract
De Gaulle's attitude towards Italy after the fall of the Fascist regime has changed from the initial possibility of a rapprochement to the indifference and even hostility shown towards Italian residents, prisoners, patriots, etc. Furthermore the General’s attitude towards Italy was influenced by the Allied policy towards our country: not being invited to attend the signing of the armistice caused the non-recognition of Italy as a Cobelligerent nation, while the repeal of the 1940 armistice by Badoglio provided the legal justification for considering Italians as still enemies and acting accordingly. Again the exclusion from the Yalta conference led de Gaulle to give the order to invade the Aosta Valley. The enthusiasm shown by the Italians about the (few) words pronounced in July 1943 by de Gaulle did not get a positive feedback on the French side. The anti-fascists who had fought the regime and acclaimed de Gaulle were nevertheless forced to accept French requests, for example about Tunisia, with much suffering, aware of the injustices and mistreatment of Italian residents. General de Gaulle personal papers, which contain unpublished documents exchanged with his closest collaborators, such as Massigli, Couve de Murville, Burin des Roziers, etc., reveal the real intentions that the French leader was able to hide in the meetings with the Italian representatives. The analysis of these papers clearly shows the French persistent recriminations and the possibility of making an arrangement only in order to protect their own interests and leadership in Europe or in the colonies.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
