We deploy a game-theoretic approach for analysing the acceptability of arguments in a generic Abstract Argumentation Framework. The result is a ranking-based semantics, which sorts arguments from the most to the least acceptable. In the computation of such a ranking, we adopt the Shapley Value formula, since it is usually used to fairly distribute costs to several entities in coalitions (labelled sets of arguments in our case). Finally, we show that some well-known properties are satisfied by the ranked-semantics we designed, and we provide an example of how our approach works.

A cooperative-game approach to share acceptability and rank arguments

Bistarelli, Stefano;GIULIODORI, PAOLO;Santini, Francesco;Taticchi, Carlo
2019

Abstract

We deploy a game-theoretic approach for analysing the acceptability of arguments in a generic Abstract Argumentation Framework. The result is a ranking-based semantics, which sorts arguments from the most to the least acceptable. In the computation of such a ranking, we adopt the Shapley Value formula, since it is usually used to fairly distribute costs to several entities in coalitions (labelled sets of arguments in our case). Finally, we show that some well-known properties are satisfied by the ranked-semantics we designed, and we provide an example of how our approach works.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11391/1448898
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