Aiuti di stato e banking resolution negli scenari di crisi pre e post COVID-19

This article stems from the reconstruction of the EU Commission’s soft law intervention in the midst of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the “necessary” compatibility of the measures ordered in favor of banks in derogation of the state aid rules; to then outline the change of direction adopted in the 2013 Banking Communica- tion, which led to the introduction of “burden sharing”, the antecedent of the so-called bail in, at the center of the new regulation of the BRRD Directive on banking crises, one of the pillars of the Banking Union, of which the essential elements are outlined, highlighting its continuing incompleteness; Following are some reflections on the criti- calities of the new rules on Banking resolution that emerged in the recent banking crises in the eurozone, between escaping from the bail in and re-emergence of State interven- tionism, “endorsed” by the Union. The subsequent eruption of the pandemic emergency from covid-19 and the emergency response of the EU Commission with the derogating Temporary Framework — between continuity and discontinuity with the crisis of 2008’ Aid Scheme — are discussed below, whose essential profiles are declined, placing attention above all to ad hoc state aid to banks, together with internal emergency measures to support the banking system, from which a sort of “consolidation” of the public intervention model “save MPS” seems to emerge. Finally, the contribution dedicates some initial reflections on the impact of the covid-19 on the banks of the eurozone, between the risks of further asymmetric-distorting effects and the acceleration towards new scenarios in the banking resolution.