This paper analyzes the conflicts between the Italian State and Regions during the COVID-19 crisis. The document highlights how the lack of a clear definition of competences and the fragmented approach in managing the emergency led to several different State-Region interaction regimes: • Competitiveness: Initially, the State and Regions operated competitively, leading to jurisdictional conflicts and regional ordinances contrasting with national measures. • Exclusivity: Subsequently, a regime of exclusivity was established, with the State holding the primary decision-making power. • Loyal Collaboration: In an intermediate phase, an attempt was made to promote collaboration, but this led to moments of tension and subsequent conflicts. • Algorithm: The introduction of a system based on an algorithm for classifying regions into risk zones generated new conflicts due to inaccurate data and political interpretations. • Decree-Law: Finally, with the arrival of 2021, there was a return to normality, with the Government centralizing decision-making power through decree-laws. The article underscores the lack of loyal collaboration between the State and Regions as the main cause of the conflicts, highlighting the need for more effective tools to resolve disputes and guarantee the unity of the legal system. The ruling of the Constitutional Court of March 12, 2021, further reduced the role of the Regions, limiting their decision-making autonomy. The author concludes by emphasizing the need for constant dialogue and effective collaboration between the State and Regions for a more effective management of future crises.
L’articolo analizza i conflitti tra Stato e Regioni italiane durante la crisi del COVID-19. Il documento evidenzia come la mancanza di una chiara definizione delle competenze e l'approccio frammentato nella gestione dell'emergenza abbiano portato a diversi regimi di interazione Stato-Regioni: • Concorrenzialità: inizialmente, Stato e Regioni operavano in modo concorrenziale, portando a conflitti giurisdizionali e ordinanze regionali contrastanti con le misure nazionali. • Esclusività: successivamente, si è passati a un regime di esclusività, con lo Stato che deteneva il potere decisionale principale. • Leale collaborazione: in una fase intermedia, si è cercato di promuovere la collaborazione, ma ciò ha portato a momenti di tensione e successivi conflitti. • Algoritmo: l'introduzione di un sistema basato su un algoritmo per la classificazione delle regioni in zone di rischio ha generato nuovi conflitti a causa di dati imprecisi e interpretazioni politiche. • Decreto-legge: infine, con l'avvento del 2021, si è assistito a un ritorno alla normalità, con il Governo che ha centralizzato il potere decisionale tramite decreti-legge. L'articolo sottolinea la mancanza di una leale collaborazione tra Stato e Regioni è stata la causa principale dei conflitti, evidenziando la necessità di strumenti più efficaci per risolvere le controversie e garantire l'unità del sistema legale. La sentenza della Corte Costituzionale del 12 marzo 2021 ha ulteriormente ridimensionato il ruolo delle Regioni, limitando la loro autonomia decisionale. L'autore conclude sottolineando la necessità di un dialogo costante e di una collaborazione effettiva tra Stato e Regioni per una gestione più efficace delle crisi future.
Superiorem non recognoscens, ovvero quando la leale collaborazione non funziona
ANTONIO BARTOLINI
2021
Abstract
This paper analyzes the conflicts between the Italian State and Regions during the COVID-19 crisis. The document highlights how the lack of a clear definition of competences and the fragmented approach in managing the emergency led to several different State-Region interaction regimes: • Competitiveness: Initially, the State and Regions operated competitively, leading to jurisdictional conflicts and regional ordinances contrasting with national measures. • Exclusivity: Subsequently, a regime of exclusivity was established, with the State holding the primary decision-making power. • Loyal Collaboration: In an intermediate phase, an attempt was made to promote collaboration, but this led to moments of tension and subsequent conflicts. • Algorithm: The introduction of a system based on an algorithm for classifying regions into risk zones generated new conflicts due to inaccurate data and political interpretations. • Decree-Law: Finally, with the arrival of 2021, there was a return to normality, with the Government centralizing decision-making power through decree-laws. The article underscores the lack of loyal collaboration between the State and Regions as the main cause of the conflicts, highlighting the need for more effective tools to resolve disputes and guarantee the unity of the legal system. The ruling of the Constitutional Court of March 12, 2021, further reduced the role of the Regions, limiting their decision-making autonomy. The author concludes by emphasizing the need for constant dialogue and effective collaboration between the State and Regions for a more effective management of future crises.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
