Modello storico e regionale: un'analisi economica e politica del disaccoppiamento nella riforma della PAC

One of the most relevant features of the Fischler CAP reform is the wide margin of manoeuvre left open to the member states. In fact, member states are directly involved in a series of political decisions, whose the most innovative one is represented by the choice between a regional or historical model of decoupling. This is the most relevant option both from a political and an economical point of view, since it directly affects the subsidies delivery criteria at a territorial, firm level. This article aims at analysing the economical and political consequences of adopting one of the two mentioned schemes. The historical model of decoupling, which is already in use both in Italy and in the majority of the European countries, even it proved to have largely better effects than the previous coupled payments, brought about a series of difficulties and risks which could be easily overcome by the adoption of the regional model, whose main advantage is guarantying a bigger equity amongst its beneficiaries. If compared to the historical model, the regional one meets more appropriately both the internal (such as justifying agricultural subsidies, improving firm’s market orientation, strengthening agricultural competitiveness) and the external (such as international trade agreements) new challenges to the CAP. There are different versions of the regional model (pure, hybrid, mixed, dynamic) and especially the dynamic one (already adopted in Germany, England, Finland, Denmark) could represent the first step towards improving the side-effects of decoupling. In fact, in this case, the decoupled payments to historical farmers will be decreasing in time, to became after some years homogeneous at the territorial level, thus acquiring the meaning of being a compensation to farmers for cross-compliances duties.