Dalla proposizione negativa all’ineffabilità. Oggetti, tautologie e silenzio nel Tractatus logico-philosophicus

In this paper, I will commence by delving into a compelling analogy proposed by Cimmino (2003), which establishes an ideal connection between the Tractatus and the Sophist based on two Platonic aporias concerning the problem of saying what is not (§§ 1–2). This exploration will pave the way for elucidating the foundational principles of the picture theory articulated in the Tractatus (§ 3), while concurrently addressing one of its most intricate challenges: the problem of objects (§ 4). Subsequently, I will delve deeper into the formal concept of object, emphasizing its pivotal role within the framework of the Tractatus, and elucidating the anti-skeptical approach associated with it (§ 5). In § 6, I will elaborate on the rationale underlying the thesis of the ineffability of objects, endeavoring to demonstrate how the inherent tension between ontology and epistemology can be reconciled by correlating the concept of object with that of tautology modulo the notion of formal property (§ 7).