The use of the supplementary rules by the Constitutional Court has always been based on widely autonomous choices, even in relation to the legislator. In that case the role of judge and legislator concurs in the same subject, therefore the power of self-regulation of the Court is not comparable to that of Parliament. The tendency to make an extensive and incisive use of supplementary rules has been confirmed and consolidated by the edits introduced since 2020. The same tendency influences also the debate concerning a possible introduction of dissenting opinion. It is a common belief that the dissenting opinion could be introduced into the Italian constitutional justice through the supplementary rules. Reality brings out a legislator reluctant to intervene on the constitutional justice and a Court that has become accustomed to regulating its own adjudication.
L’utilizzo delle norme integrative da parte della Corte costituzionale è sempre avvenuto sulla base di scelte ampiamente autonome, anche rispetto al legislatore. La peculiarità per cui nello stesso soggetto vengono a convergere il ruolo di giudice e legislatore rende il potere di autonormazione della Corte non assimilabile a quello riconosciuto alle Camere. La tendenza ad utilizzare in modo ampio ed incisivo le norme integrative trova conferma e si consolida con le modifiche apportate alle norme integrative a partire dal 2020. La stessa tendenza influisce anche nel dibattito relativo all’eventuale apertura all’opinione dissenziente. È ormai diffusa l’idea che sia possibile introdurre l’opinione dissenziente nella giustizia costituzionale italiana attraverso le norme integrative. La realtà di fatto ci pone di fronte ad un legislatore poco propenso ad intervenire nell’ambito della giustizia costituzionale e ad una Corte ormai abituata a disciplinare da sola il suo processo.
Sull'utilizzo delle norme integrative da parte della Corte costituzionale
Luciana Pesole
2025
Abstract
The use of the supplementary rules by the Constitutional Court has always been based on widely autonomous choices, even in relation to the legislator. In that case the role of judge and legislator concurs in the same subject, therefore the power of self-regulation of the Court is not comparable to that of Parliament. The tendency to make an extensive and incisive use of supplementary rules has been confirmed and consolidated by the edits introduced since 2020. The same tendency influences also the debate concerning a possible introduction of dissenting opinion. It is a common belief that the dissenting opinion could be introduced into the Italian constitutional justice through the supplementary rules. Reality brings out a legislator reluctant to intervene on the constitutional justice and a Court that has become accustomed to regulating its own adjudication.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
